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Unlike the legislative sessions of 1985 and 1986, and contrary to
the usual expectations for the last session in a given legislature's term
of office, the 1987 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature produced
some significant changes in the Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act").
Some of these changes require extended comment in this space.
A series of acts dealing with medical treatment and expenses is likely
to make the biggest impact on the practical administration of compen-
sation claims. Act 492' places some reasonable limitations on both the
employer and the employee with respect to medical examinations. It
retains the requirement, in section 1121 of the Act, that the claimant
submit himself to medical examinations as reasonably necessary, but
specifies that the carrier shall not require the employee to be examined
by more than one specialist in a field without the employee's consent.
On the other side, however, the amendment codifies the principle that
the employee has the right to select, one treating physician in each
specialty, but requires that he obtain the employer's consent to change
specialists after that initial choice. If a court determines that the employer
has withheld that consent arbitrarily, the employer is subject to attorney's
fees related to the dispute and any additional medical expenses caused
by the refusal.
Act 4932 likewise places some limits on the reimbursement due for
certain medical procedures. A health care provider may not incur more
than an aggregate of $1,000.00 in "nonemergency diagnostic testing or
treatment" without the mutual consent of the employer or carrier and
the employee.' If the provider does so, the obligation to pay the fee is
not enforceable against the employer or the carrier. Fees incurred for
emergency treatment are not affected by the limitation, but the provider
bears the burden of proving that the treatment was indeed of an emer-
gency nature. As with the provisions on change of specialist in Act 492,
the employer or carrier is subject to an award of attorney's fees related
to the dispute as well as any additional medical expenses caused by a
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refusal to agree to treatment if that refusal is found by a court to have
been arbitrary.
A health care provider which has treated the employee at any time
is required under Act 4944 to release medical information and records
to the employee, employer or carrier (or their representatives) concerning
the alleged compensable injury. The records are to be held confidential
by the employer or insurer, with an exception for their use before the
Director5 or in court.
Problems which have been caused by the failure of claimants to
attach a certificate of rejection of the Director's recommendation in a
given claim to their district court petition are addressed in Act 291 . 6 If
there is a dispute between the employer and the employee, either may
seek the recommendation of the Director and must do so prior to filing
a law suit.7 The original petition must contain a copy of a "certificate
of rejection" from the Director, certifying that his recommendation was
rejected by one of the parties.' If the certificate is not attached, the
petition is subject to dismissal as premature. 9
In many instances, petitions have not been accompanied by the
required certificate. This has occurred either due to ignorance of the
statutory requirement or because the certificate was not physically avail-
able within the time limitations required for filing the petition. Act 291
attempts to solve the problem by providing that the suit is not premature
if the certificate is presented "at or prior to" the time of the hearing
on an exception of prematurity. 0
This establishes a rather peculiar procedure. If the certificate is not
attached initially, the opposing party (usually the carrier or employer)
by answering without interposing the plea will waive the exception of
prematurity. If the exception is interposed, however, the prematurity
problem may be cured by the presentation of the certificate at the
hearing. Thus, a petition, though premature when brought, becomes
ripe when heard. The only case in which an action would be premature
under the revised standard would, in all likelihood, be a case in which
the Director's office has never been consulted at all.
Act 396" contains a small, but nonetheless potentially significant,
change in the calculation of an average weekly wage for a person earning
4. 1987 La. Acts No. 494.
5. Director of the Office of Worker's Compensation Administration (hereinafter
"Director").
6. 1987 La. Acts No. 291.
7. La. R.S. 23:1310 (1985); La. R.S. 23:1311 (1985).
8. La. R.S. 23:1311(C) (1985).
9. La. R.S. 23:1314(B) (1985).
10. 1987 La. Acts No. 291.
11. 1987 La. Acts No. 396.
[Vol. 48
WORKERS' COMPENSA TION
his wages on a monthly basis. Prior to the amendment, the calculation
was made by dividing his monthly salary by four. If a person earned
$1,600.00 per month, his average weekly wage for purposes of deter-
mining weekly benefits would be $400.00 per week under such a cal-
culation. After this amendment, the calculation is to be made by first
multiplying the monthly salary by twelve and then dividing the resulting
amount by fifty-two. The same hypothetical employee under the new
calculation would be earning an average weekly wage of $369.23.
The remaining legislative acts affecting workers' compensation do




Faithful readers of this column are quite aware of the judicial and
legislative tug-of-war during recent years over the status of deputy sheriffs
and their entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. 3 Though pages
could be written to remind readers of the background, it suffices to
note that the core of the disagreement centers around the question of
whether a deputy sheriff is a "public official," and thus is excluded
from coverage as a non-employee, or a public employee entitled to the
same coverage as other employees. If one classifies deputies as public
employees entitled to coverage, an important accessory issue arises:
Should the local sheriff or the state itself pay for the coverage?
Gradually, through the process of judicial and legislative refinement,
it appears to have been established, and properly so, that deputy sheriffs
12. 1987 La. Acts No. 266 amends La. R.S. 23:1181 (1985) to increase, from $25,000.00
to $100,000.00, the amount of Louisiana immovable property which a foreign employer
liable for Louisiana workers' compensation benefits must own in order to be self-insured
without securing liability insurance or posting the requisite statutory bond. 1987 La. Acts
No. 290 amends La. R.S. 23:1203(C) (1985) to specify that, if an employee uses his own
vehicle to obtain necessary medical care, the appropriate mileage rate for his reimbursement
is that rate established by the state for reimbursement of state employees using their own
vehicles on state business. 1987 La. Acts No. 633 enacts La. R.S. 23:1203.1 authorizing
the state to fix a fee schedule for medical services payable in state self-insured workers'
compensation matters. One is entitled to wonder whether the principle of fee schedules
in such matters will prove contagious to workers' compensation claims against private
employers.
13. A convenient summary of the developments over recent years is contained in
Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Workers' Compensation, 42 La. L. Rev.
620, 645-46 (1981). Even after that discussion, the battle raged in the legislature and the
courts. See 1981 La. Special Sess. Acts No. 25 (codified as La. R.S. 23:1034 (1985));
Brodnax v. Cappel, 425 So. 2d 232 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), overruled in Kahl v. Baudoin,
449 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1984); and finally 1985 La. Acts No. 954, adding La. R.S. 23:1034(D)
(1985 and Supp. 1987).
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should be treated as employees rather than officials-despite the fact
that the Act "defines" them as public officials. The obvious intent of
the definition is not to suggest that deputy sheriffs are really officials
rather than employees. Rather, it must be that the state does not want
to be liable for the expense of their compensation coverage. As em-
ployees, they are entitled to a compensation remedy from someone,
either the state or a local political subdivision. The precise assignment
of the cost of the compensation is a detail which for the moment
appears to have been fixed against local political subdivisions.
Inclusion of deputy sheriffs in local government coverage and pay-
ment of that cost by local political subdivisions, however, has been left
by the legislature to the discretion of the local authorities. As the Bard
has it, thereby hangs a tale. In Parker v. Cappel, 4 the inclusion of
some deputies and the exclusion of others, either by statute or by choice
of local authorities, was upheld against constitutional attack. A deputy
suffered a stroke and died four days later. His widow sued for com-
pensation benefits, alleging that his death occurred in the course of and
arose out of his employment. She sued the local sheriff, whose parish
did not provide workers' compensation coverage for its deputies, and
later added the state by amendment. Both the sheriff and the parish
filed exceptions of no cause of action, but the trial court overruled
both, holding the pertinent portions of the Act unconstitutional.
The widow argued that, since the Act specifically provides coverage
for the deputies of the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff 5 but leaves
coverage for other deputies to local discretion, it denies equal protection
of the law to deputy sheriffs in other parishes. The Louisiana Supreme
Court rejected the argument, finding that the legislation furthers an
appropriate state interest. It identified differences between the Orleans
Parish Criminal Sheriff and other sheriffs in the state, and found a
suitable foundation for the distinction made in the statute.
The court's decision helps to advance the eventual solution to the
problem somewhat, but the facts did not afford the opportunity to
provide a complete solution. As the court noted, it was loath to rewrite
the legislation judicially. The opinion left little doubt that the court
believed that deputies should not be made to bear their work-related
accident costs on their own, a view which is whole-heartedly supported
here.' 6 The present statute is troublesome because if literally read it
14. 500 So. 2d 771 (La. 1987).
15. La. R.S. 23:1034(A) (1985). The statute does not specify who is to bear the
expense of the coverage, but one may glean from other parts of the section the conclusion
that it is unlikely that these deputies would be regarded as employees of the state.
16. "We leave the Legislature to address the criticism. Absent that response, the
parishes may provide their own workers' compensation to sheriff's deputies, whose salaries
probably ill-afford coverage for work-related injuries." Parker, 500 So. 2d at 776.
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"defines" deputies as "public officers and officials" of their local
parishes, but then authorizes workers' compensation coverage for them
(at local expense, of course).
There is a direct and simple solution. These and other workers who
are in fact not public officers or officials in the workers' compensation
context should be referred to and defined as employees; their coverage
should be mandatory as with other employees; and the cost of that
coverage should be squarely assigned to someone, whether it be the state
or the local political subdivision. The work-related accident costs of
deputy sheriffs is too important an issue to be the subject of a political
football game.
Heart Attacks and Strokes
During this term, the Louisiana Supreme Court returned to some
ground that it had successfully tilled several years ago. Difficult ground
it is, too. There are very few physical incidents that present more
troublesome causation problems than heart attacks, strokes and other
vascular accidents. Almost every jurisdiction encounters difficulty in
assigning causation in such matters, and Louisiana has been no exception.
In 1982, the Louisiana Supreme Court authored two opinions which
offered significant guidelines to the lower courts in resolving these prob-
lems-Adams v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.17 and Guidry v. Sline
Industrial Painters, Inc."5 These decisions were discussed in detail in this
forum at that time.19 In general terms, Adams on original hearing had
indicated a rather lenient view toward proof of work relationship, and
Guidry was somewhat more rigorous. On re-hearing, the Adams opinion
moved closer to the announced Guidry rationale, and it seemed likely
that Guidry would prove to be the more influential decision.
The opinion in Reid v. Gamb, Inc.,20 during this term, seems to
confirm this view. There were indications after Guidry that the courts
of appeal were using its "stress greater than non-employment life" test
in instances of pre-existing disposition to heart attack or stroke and
were reaching conclusions of denial of benefits more often than had
been done previously. 2 In Reid, the lower courts followed this pattern
17. 418 So. 2d 485 (La. 1982).
18. 418 So. 2d 626 (La. 1982).
19, Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Workers' Compensation, 43 La.
L. Rev. 613, 617-21 (1982).
20, 509 So. 2d 995 (La. 1987).
21, See, e.g., Mayeaux v. Commercial Union Ins. Cos., 492 So. 2d 188 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1986) (pains occuring at home after a rather ordinary work day were not considered
work-related); Edwards v. Exxon Co., 485 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
489 So. 2d 250 (1986) (stroke after minor physical exertion not work-related, even though
19871
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in denying recovery and the supreme court granted a writ, but did not
change the result. Instead it simply took the opportunity to clarify the
Guidry rationale.
The employee was the district manager of five restaurants in a region
composed of several parishes. He visited the various stores on a periodic
basis, performing various administrative and managerial tasks. On the
date in question, he was working with other employees to prepare a
restaurant for its opening day. At 6:00 p.m., he finished work and
picked up a snack at a convenience store. He repaired to his motel
room, where he experienced some numbness in his right arm and hand
just before he went to sleep. When he awoke the next morning, he
found that he could not lift his right arm. A cerebral vascular accident
was diagnosed.
The majority opinion in Reid took the predictable step of extending
the Guidry rationale from heart attacks to vascular accidents (strokes).
22
More importantly, the court announced that it would no longer respect
the distinction between the physical nature of employment stress and
purely mental or emotional stress, and that it also would no longer
respect the distinction between "extraordinary" stress and "ordinary"
stress. If there was a distinction between the treatment of vascular
accidents in the earlier decision in McDonald v. International Paper
Co. 23 and the treatment in Reid, the court thus seemed rather clear that
it intended the distinction to cease.
The result in Reid was a denial of benefits. The supreme court
could discern no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Worker
had shown no causal connection whatsoever between his work and his
injury. Thus, regardless of the formula used to test the causal rela-
tionship, his effort had to fail. The significance of Reid is not in its
present result, however, but in its future use. Even though serving as
a clarification of Guidry, it will suggest a very slight development of
the rationale in such future cases toward a somewhat relaxed standard
for recovery. Caution should be exercised, as always, to delineate as
carefully as possible between those risks properly assignable to employ-
ment and those which are truly personal risks that the employment
enterprise should not bear.
Lenient Standards for Measuring Temporary Total Disability
Last year's discussion in this forum noted that judicial ingenuity
had triumphed over legislative craftsmanship once again in the workers'
it occurred on job premises during work hours); Johnson v. Hendrix Mfg. Co., 475 So.
2d 103 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985) (no causal link shown between exertion of employment
activities and heart attack).
22. 509 So. 2d at 998.
23. 406 So. 2d 582 (La. 1981).
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compensation field.24 The drafters of the comprehensive 1983 amend-
ments had carefully amended the provisions relative to total and per-
manent disability and (formerly) permanent partial disability benefits
(now Supplemental Earnings Benefits, or SEB) to overrule the so-called
odd lot doctrine, and generally to impose very rigorous standards de-
signed to make total and permanent disability awards rare indeed.
25
Curiously, the provisions governing temporary total disability benefits
were left unchanged. As discussed in this space last year, 26 the courts
were quick to note the omission and to conclude that there must have
been no intent to change the pre-1983 provisions insofar as they were
applicable to temporary total disability cases. Those provisions also
permitted a lesser standard of proof-the ordinary preponderance of
evidence as opposed to the clear and convincing standard chosen by the
1983 drafters. From there, it was only a small step to a determination
that the claimant in the case at hand was indeed in a temporary status,
and that, accordingly, he should be entitled to the standard used in
disability cases prior to* 1983.
At the time last year's symposium was written, there were only two
examples of this trend. Last year's trickle, however, has turned into
this year's deluge. In numerous cases decided during this term, claimants
were held to have established their right to temporary total disability
benefits by a preponderance of the evidence on the basis of pre-1983
concepts such as odd lot status or working in pain. 27 In many of these
24. Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1985-1986-Workers' Compensation, 47 La.
L. Rev. 521 (1987).
25. Cf. Johnson, Bound in Shallows and Miseries: The 1983 Amendments to the
Workers' Compensation Statute, 44 La. L. Rev. 669, 679 (1984).
26. Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1985-1986-Workers' Compensation, 47 La.
L. Rev. 521 (1987).
27. Price v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 502 So. 2d 1078 (La. 1987) (temporary total
disability (TTD) established during six-month period); Talley v. Enserch Corp., 508 So.
2d 197 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) (claimant failed to prove permanent total disability by
clear and convincing evidence, but proved TTD by preponderance of the evidence during
thirty-month period); Green v. Jackson Rapid Delivery Serv., 506 So. 2d 1,345 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1987) (claimant showed entitlement to TTD payments for one-year period); Johnson
v. Monroe Pulpwood Co., 505 So. 2d 862 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987) (claimant established
right to TTD payments, based upon substantial pain, "until termination of disability" in
a few years); Bailey v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 503 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987)
(TTD payments awarded lasting from October, 1983, through trial and until an indefinite
point in the future); Lang Pham v. Delta Petroleum Co., 503 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1987) (entitlement to TTD payments shown, but case remanded for further taking
of evidence); Thomas v. Elder Pallet & Lumber Sales, Inc., 493 So. 2d 1267 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1986) (odd lot doctrine continues to apply to TTD cases). Occasionally, there
was a ruling that the claimant should be denied recovery because he had not established
entitlement to total and permanent disability benefits by clear and convincing evidence.
Roszell v. INA of Texas, Inc., 499 So. 2d 659 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
1987]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
cases, there is little doubt that the court was intent upon finding a way
to use the pre-1983 standards to afford relief, and almost no doubt
that the results were the very ones that the 1983 amendments were
intended to prevent.
The writer will resist the temptation to point out that such a judicial
effort to adjust the balance struck by the 1983 amendments was pre-
dictable and predicted. The treatment of injuries under the rubric of
temporary total disability benefits in the manner indicated in these cases
seriously undermines the reform undertaken by the 1983 amendments.
The question now is whether the inevitable legislative re-adjustment will
make some attempt to restore a more rational balance, or whether only
this particular omission will be corrected-only to leave another spot
in the Act where the judiciary will choose to adjust the balance once
again.
Rehabilitation
An otherwise unremarkable decision during this term gives us some
insight into the way in which the new provisions on rehabilitation might
be interpreted. In Works v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,28 the claim-
ant had suffered a serious work injury that left him with a 25% disability.
The employer's insurer determined that the claimant/employee was en-
titled to rehabilitation, and eventually placed him with his old employer
at his old rate of pay, but with modifications in his duties to accom-
modate his disability.
As a practical matter, however, the claimant found that he was
having to exceed the defined limits of his "new" job with some fre-
quency, and naturally was worried about the permanency of his new
arrangement. The employee felt he was entitled to additional rehabili-
tation services which would re-train him in a different skill for a job
of a more permanent nature that he could perform within his physical
limitations. The insurer resisted, and the trial court denied any further
rehabilitation services on the ground that he was earning the same
amount earned before his injury.
The appellate court reversed, noting that it was very significant to
the court that the insurer had agreed that rehabilitation services were
justified. Having done that, the insurer could only then question the
extent of rehabilitation. In the court's mind, rehabilitation meant more
than restoration of the employee to his old wages. It disagreed with
defendant's expert that the paramount goal of rehabilitation was to put
the injured person back at his old job with his old employer at his old
wage.
28. 501 So. 2d 1045 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 48
WORKERS' COMPENSA TION
While "simple and pragmatic" in the court's words, this view is
"not correct." ' 29 The court regarded this incorrect interpretation of the
goal of rehabilitation as specialized job placement that was inherently
transitory and contingent upon the good will of the old employer. Rather,
the court saw the statute as requiring "vocational education and ap-
propriate training to make the worker competitive in the labor market."3 0
The case was remanded for an appropriate order requiring rehabilitation
of the worker to prepare him for "secure, suitable employment."3 1
Intentional Act Exclusion
Ever since its introduction into the Act in 1976, the so-called in-
tentional act exclusion has proved troublesome. The legislative intent
must clearly have been to interject some balance into the tort immunity
scheme that it was extending to executive officers and co-employees,
providing that though they were entitled to tort immunity in most
instances, they were not to be excused from liability "resulting from
an intentional act."
32
This peculiar choice of language was unfortunate, but to its credit,
the supreme court rather early announced the proposition that "inten-
tional act" in this context meant simply "intentional tort."3 3 Thus a
claimant, in order to establish that he should not be limited to a
compensation remedy, had to prove either that the actor desired the
harmful or offensive consequences of his conduct, or must have known
to a virtual certainty that they would occur.
3 4
There was little dissent from this view,35 but there was considerable
dissent about the mechanics of getting to that point in the inquiry.
Could the claimant survive a threshold dismissal device such as an
exception of no cause or a summary judgment by the mere incantation
of "intentional" conduct? Even the supreme court provided mixed signals
on the issue.3 6 Understandably, the intermediate appellate courts were
29. Id. at 1047.
30. Id. at 1048.
31. Id.
32. La. R.S; 23:1032 (1985).
33. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 480 (La. 1981).
34. Id. at 481.
35. Unless one considers the decision in Citizen v. Daigle, 418 So. 2d 598 (La. 1982)
as dissent. In that case, the supreme court ignored and thereby declined, in spite of
Justice Watson's dissent, to use the concept of "transferred intent," known to basic tort
law, in order to permit a claimant to escape tort immunity. The actor had intended
assault but accomplished battery. In his concurrence, Justice Dennis seems to indicate
that "intentional act" and "intentional tort" might not necessarily be the same.
36. Compare Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 444 So. 2d 618 (La. 1984), with Fallo
v. Tuboscope Inspection, 444 So. 2d 621 (La. 1984).
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accordingly mixed on the issue, with the broad view of the immunity
taken in Babin v. Edwards7 being the best-reasoned decision.
During this term, the supreme court had occasion to return to the
subject in Caudle v. Betts.3" A Christmas party at a car dealership was
the occasion of some shenanigans with an electric automobile condenser.
The reader will be spared most of the details; suffice it to say that the
defendant (who was president and principal stockholder of the dealership)
was found to have shocked the back of plaintiff's neck with the con-
denser and to have chased him with the condenser in hand until plaintiff
locked himself in a safe place. Among other injuries, plaintiff suffered
an unexpected impairment of his occipital nerve.
The trial judge found that defendant intended to shock plaintiff,
but did not intend to injure him beyond a passing, relatively minor
electrical shock. In other words, he intended the act and probably the
offensive consequences, but not the unforeseen harmful consequences.
Surprisingly, both the trial court and the appellate court39 applied tort
immunity and dismissed plaintiff's suit.
The case afforded the supreme court the opportunity to elaborate
upon its earlier work in the field. Quite properly, it cited basic tort
principles which establish that the intent to cause injurious consequences
as opposed to offensive consequences does not change the fact that the
victim's privacy and sense of dignity has been invaded. Moreover, every
first-year tort student is well versed in the rule of the "eggshell skull"
plaintiff, and his right to collect for even unexpected consequences of
a relatively minor contact. Thus, the fact that the actor may not have
intended the full consequences of his action is of no significance. In
this instance, it was sufficient that the defendant intended the offensive
contact, and must as a matter of law be liable for the consequences of
his act, however remote they might be.
Affirmation of these basic tort principles at the fringe of the com-
pensation statutes, however, serves to highlight the continuing problem.
No doubt the appellate court was moved by the unstated concern that
full exposure in tort for the employer/actor seemed too harsh a sanction
for conduct which was essentially horseplay in the workplace that got
out of hand. Its reaction was to attempt to re-define tort principles
otherwise well established in general tort law. The result would ultimately
be two kinds of tort law, one for use in its own realm and one for
use in workers' compensation matters. Such an artificial distinction could
not long last, even though it might be accomplishing "just" results in
the eyes of some.
37. 456 So. 2d 659 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 460 So. 2d 604 (1984).
38. No. 87-C-0445 (La. Sept. 9, 1987).
39. Caudle v. Betts, 502 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
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Perhaps we need to re-visit the suggestion made in this forum some
years ago. 4° It was then suggested that re-entry into the tort system
should be reserved for those particularly heinous situations which oc-
casionally arise in the workplace, such as a physical assault by a su-
pervisor on a worker. Some might say that the facts in Caudle are close
enough to such conduct that the re-entry into tort was appropriate. So
long, however, as the appellate courts continue to be somewhat reluctant
to impose the ultimate sanction of potential tort liability (as evidenced
by the surprising lower court decisions in Caudle), the supreme court
will have to engage in legitimate "balancing," proper though it may
have been in this instance.
Also, so long as that process continues, there is the danger that
conduct at the fringe of "horseplay" in the workplace might be the
basis for re-entry into the tort system. The tendency will be to give the
benefit of the doubt to the claimant under those circumstances, and we
may look up in ten years and find that the intentional act loophole is
truck-sized rather than the size of a knitting needle. Perhaps the leg-
islature should once again consider the possibility of a less draconian
sanction for intentional torts, such as double the workers' compensation
payment otherwise due the claimant, as some type of penalty in lieu of
full tort liability.
Immunity of the Principal after Berry v. Holston Well Service
Easily the most discussed decision in workers' compensation in the
last three years, Berry v. Holston Well Service, Inc.41 is now past its
infancy and into a stable if not necessarily thriving childhood. As faithful
readers will recall, Berry established a three-part inquiry to determine
whether the work in which the injured claimant was involved at the
time of his injury was part of the trade, business or occupation of the
alleged principal. Failure of the alleged principal to hurdle successfully
each of the three parts of the inquiry means at least that there can be
no summary judgment in its favor and would ordinarily mean no im-
munity after a trial on the merits.
The opinion was expressed in last year's comments that the Berry
rationale might be more of a restatement of the law than new law.
Experience during this term tends, predictably, to demonstrate support
for both parts of that statement. In one group of cases, the initial Berry
inquiry of whether the work of the injured employee was "specialized
40. Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Workers' Compensation, 43 La.
L. Rev. 613, 626-29 (1982).
41. 488 So. 2d 934 (La. 1986). See Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1985-1986-
Workers' Compensation, 47 La. L. Rev. 521, 523-25 (1987), for initial comments shortly
after the decision was released.
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per se" had been decisive, resulting in a conclusion that the work was
not part of the trade of the principal and therefore tort immunity was
not available. 42 In another group of cases, surprisingly numerous, the
principal survived the "specialized per se" test and successfully dem-
onstrated that the work was not so specialized that it could not be
considered a part of its regular trade, business or occupation. 41 The
immunity of the general contractor in the construction field has proved
resilient, under the so-called "dual contract" or "contract and contract
out" alternative basis for tort immunity under section 1061."
Whether Berry has actually changed the law as to the immunity of
the principal depends in part upon whom one asks. Opponents of the
immunity naturally think that it has, and can cite the cases above in
which the "specialized per se" conclusion has defeated the immunity.
Friends of the immunity can point to the equal number of instances in
which the "specialized per se" rubric has not been definitive. The
supreme court has not had occasion to re-visit the subject during this
term. Even if it should do so, the writer sees no reason to depart from
the view expressed last year. The ultimate solution should be legislative
rather than judicial.
42. Chauvin v. Gulf Coast Minerals, Inc., 509 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987)
(work of erection of steel for commercial building found to be specialized per se; interesting
discussion of jury question as to whether the contract in question was "to perform" or
"to provide"); Davis v. Material Delivery Serv., Inc., 506 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1987) (over-the-road truck driver operating lime truck and required to load and
unload lime was doing work which was specialized per se); Miller v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 499 So. 2d 1095 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 501 So. 2d 198 (1987)
(welding as part of drilling process held to be specialized per se); Teague v. Sawyer
Drilling Co., 499 So. 2d 127 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986) (cementing of surface casing as
part of oil well drilling process held to be specialized per se); Roberts v. Amstar Corp.,
496 So. 2d 1146 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (pipefitting is specialized per se).
43. Lewis v. Modular Quarters, 508 So. 2d 975 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) (sandblasting
and painting not specialized per se; other evidence demonstrated that work was within
trade of alleged principal; summary judgment in favor of principal affirmed); Recatto v.
Bayou Steel Corp., 508 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987) (work of electrician not
specialized per se; other evidence demonstrated that regular employees of alleged principal
did same work at same time; summary judgment affirmed); Cantrell v. BASF Wyandotte,
506 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987) (work of security guard not specialized per se;
although such work had always been contracted out, the court nonetheless affirmed
summary judgment); Palmer v. Loyola Univ., 496 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986)
(janitorial and labor services not specialized per se, but case remanded since no evidence
was available to proceed to other levels of inquiry under Berry).
44. Jackson v. Louisiana Power & Light, 510 So. 2d 8 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987);
Guillory v. Ducote, 509 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987) (court also noted that
alternative argument that carpentry was specialized per se was incorrect); Williams v.




It appears that a consensus is emerging in the cases with respect to
the claim of a spouse of loss of consortium when the injury to the
employed spouse is covered by workers' compensation. In a word (or
several), the loss of consortium claim is seen as derivative, and is subject
to the same defenses as the claim of the injured employee spouse would
be. This is consistent with the treatment of the claim for loss of con-
sortium in other contexts, and thus is a predictable result.
There are only two cases, but the opinions to date have been
unanimous. 45 The results are correct, and demonstrate that the courts
have the proper view of the importance of maintaining the delicate
balance upon which the Act rests. The results indicate that the courts
are resisting the temptation to use the loss of consortium issue to move
the balance used in the Act more toward the employee. It is likely that
the Act needs some movement in that direction, but the loss of con-
sortium issue would have been the wrong place to accomplish that result.
Sharing of Attorney's Fees in Interventions
The decision which holds the most potential for making practical
changes in the way workers' compensation cases are litigated and resolved
is Moody v. Arabie.46 An injured worker brought suit against various
tortfeasors, and the compensation carrier intervened. A jury found for
the worker against one of the tortfeasors and a judgment for $60,000.00
was entered. The preferential claim of the carrier for some $35,400.00
was recognized. The liability insurer of the tortfeasor tendered some
$82,300.00 in payment of the judgment amount with accrued interest
and costs. The check was made payable to the worker, his attorney and
the compensation carrier.
A dispute then arose over the disposition of the proceeds. The
carrier contended that its $35,400.00 claim should be paid first, without
deduction of any amount for one-third contingency fee which plaintiff
owed to his attorney. The attorney naturally contended that this one-
third applied to the entire judgment, not just to the judgment balance
left after deduction of the amount to be paid to the intervening carrier.
The trial court resolved the dispute by applying the contingency fee
fraction to the entire amount, yielding a fee of $27,400.00. It also held
that $5,900.00 in out-of-pocket costs of the attorney should be reim-
45. Redding v. Essex Crane Rental Corp., 500 So. 2d 880 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 501 So. 2d 774 (1987); Theriot v. Damson Drilling Corp., 471 So. 2d 757
(La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 472 So. 2d 907 (1985). See also Mundy v. Kulkoni,
Inc., 503 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987).
46. 498 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1986).
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bursed as called for by the contingency fee contract. Thus, the total
payment to the worker's attorney was $33,300.00. The carrier had paid
more than $49,000.00 in benefits and expenses, but slightly less than
that amount was available from the total paid on the judgment. Thus
the compensation carrier was held to be entitled to the balance remaining
after the sum paid to the worker's attorney. It follows that the worker
received from the $82,300.00 tort judgment exactly zero.
The trial judge seemed impressed by the attorney's argument that
under Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 9:5001 the contingency fee
ranked as a first privilege on all of the proceeds of the judgment,
"priming" even the rights of the intervening carrier.
The appellate court reversed this decision, holding that the contin-
gency fee only applies to the sum left after deduction of the amounts
due to the intervening carrier. 47 This would have substantially reduced
the amount to be paid to the attorney, while permitting the intervening
carrier to receive its full reimbursement without bearing any of the costs
of the worker's attorney.
This unhappy state of affairs, whether one focuses on the trial court
decision or the appellate opinion, led the supreme court to grant a writ.
Anyone who believed that the worker was going to be left with nothing
after receiving an $82,300.00 judgment in "his" favor has simply not
been following the course of Louisiana workers' compensation cases
over the years.
The supreme court addressed the problem as one of co-owners of
a right. Both the injured worker and the compensation carrier have been
harmed by the conduct of the tortfeasor, and own together the right
to be reimbursed by that tortfeasor. As such, each is required to con-
tribute in proportion to his interest to the expenses of legal services
that inure to his benefit. Having established that proposition, it was a
simple step to the formula which would establish, as a percentage, the
amount of reimbursement of the carrier to the total amount of the tort
recovery, and then require the carrier to pay that percentage of the
attorney's fees. In the case at hand, the carrier (calculating its reim-
bursement without reference to the attorney's fees) received about 60°76
of the awarded amount, and the plaintiff the remaining 40%. Thus,
the "cost of the recovery" should be split between them in that per-
centage.
On the whole, this was good news for the worker's attorney, who
theoretically won the argument about having his one-third contingency
fee applied to the whole amount rather than to the 40% actually re-
covered by the worker. The supreme court, however, was not finished.
It also announced application of the principle, carefully crafted in other
47. 485 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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cases, 48 that courts are not bound by the agreement between client and
attorney that a specified fraction of the recovery will constitute the
attorney's fee. With regard to both the fee of the worker's attorney
and the carrier's attorney, the court clearly indicated that the issue was
for judicial resolution rather than contractual resolution between the
parties. Specifically, the court noted that in order to qualify as a
reasonable cost of recovery an attorney's fee must reflect actual services
which augmented recovery "rather than duplicative services or those
designed to benefit a single party such as the mere monitoring of
proceedings." 49
It seems obvious that neither the attorney for the worker nor the
attorney for the carrier can expect to permit the other to carry the
burden of prosecuting the case and then demand a share of the recovery
as an attorney's fee. There is no doubt a method in the court's madness.
Some have felt that there is a certain imbalance in the proceedings when
the worker lines up against alleged tortfeasors and insurers. The defend-
ants probably have greater staying power in the litigation and might
simply "wear down" the worker into a modest settlement at best. In
many instances, the role of the intervening carrier was relatively small;
it often was content to let the workers' counsel do most of the work
and it would simply pick up its portion of any recovery at the end.
Seen in this light, the court's opinion might be seen as an effort to
even up the sides just a bit, and to require as a practical matter that
the intervening carrier participate more actively in the litigation as an
opponent to the insurers on the other side. In theory, if the intervening
carrier is going to bear a portion of the fee paid to the worker's lawyer,
the carrier is going to be much more active in the case.
Indeed, it is not impossible that in some instances the carrier might
simply choose to let the worker's counsel represent its own interests and
save the cost of one attorney. Perhaps in a truly unusual case, the
worker's attorney would permit counsel for the carrier to handle the
matter. Such unusual alliances should prove very interesting. However,
one thing is clear: Neither the carrier nor the worker can any longer
be indifferent to the role played by the other, or by their respective
counsel. This, it is submitted, was precisely what the supreme court was
striving to achieve in Moody.
48. See Leenerts Farms, Inc.. v. Rogers, 421 So. 2d 216 (La. 1982).
49. Moody, 498 So. 2d at 1086-87.'
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